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Revolution is not revolt. 
What carried the [French] 
Resistance for four years 
was revolt, which is to say 
the entire stubborn refusal, 
practically blind at first, of 
an order that wanted to make 
men kneel. Revolt is at first 
a matter of the heart. But 
there comes a time when it 
passes into the mind, where 
feeling becomes idea, and 
spontaneous outbursts end 
up in concerted action. That 
is the moment of revolution. 
(Camus, cited in Todd, 
1997: 197) 
 
What is the structure of the social? If we accept organismic metaphors, the social is 
analogous to the body, usually the human body. In managerial writings this might give 
us heads (managers, leaders and CEOs), hands (workers/employees/sub-contractors), 
and hearts (…insert your preferred academic apologist here…). In officially state-
sanctioned readings of structural Marxism, we could find a similar coding of the 
ideological superstructure in the head, the relations of production in the arrangement of 
the organs and limbs, and the forces of production in the feet (motive power) and in the 
hands (the most basic and flexible of all the tools). But even here we should recognise 
that the head as superstructure is not truly a head but a face, that is, human social and 
cultural reproduction that has become inhuman: 
The inhuman in human beings: that is what the face is from the start. It is by nature a close-up, 
with its inanimate white surfaces, its shining black holes, its emptiness and boredom. Bunker face. 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 171) 
As an image of power and naked ideology, the bunker face seems resonant. The blank 
expression and vacuous eyes of a Premier, perhaps, mouthing platitudes to the Iraqis 
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about democracy literally from a bunker deep within occupied territories. This is the 
hollow-dogma of democracy in a mass mediatised global circuit of primitive 
accumulation, where the appropriation of fossil fuels and the mobilization of ideological 
apparatuses run hand in hand (cf. Retort, 2005). 
Just as the face is a deterritorialized head, so the feet and the hands deterritorialize into 
cyborganic admixtures: couplings of hand/tool and foot/ shoe. Of these, the foot/shoe is 
the most basic foundation, the ground upon which the rest of the socialbody rests. By 
standing on two feet, the hands are freed to become tool making and using appendages, 
and the mouth is thereby freed from carrying to bear words instead.  In structural terms, 
the foot/shoe functions as base to the face’s superstructure. 
But when a shoe is thrown at the face of power, a double inversion comes into play. On 
the one hand, the base rises up to strike directly at the superstructure and to challenge 
materially the basis of its legitimacy. On the other hand, the most basic sign of 
development and civilization – the shoe – is removed from the bare foot. As well as 
turning the foot’s prosthesis into a projectile weapon, this move symbolically reaffirms 
the body against a becoming-
face or a becoming-technology. 
This moment of unshod 
insubordination asserts a basic, 
naked, human dignity in the face 
of dehumanization. 
These themes of insubordination 
and rehumanization, structure 
and ideology, run through the 
various contributions to this 
issue of ephemera. In his review 
of Göran Therborn’s book From 
Marxism to Post-Marxism?, 
David Harvie shows that 
Therborn’s history of Marxism 
focuses almost exclusively on 
state socialism and on 
institutionally established and 
legitimated academic discourses 
on Marxism. Little or no space 
is given to ‘struggle from 
below’: to the insurrectionary 
revolts and rebellions that 
brought the Soviet tanks into 
Hungary to suppress the 
workers’ uprising; to the bodies 
mobilised against power in the 
new social movements of the ’60s and ‘70s; to the even newer social movements 
protesting against globalization, the WTO, IMF, G8 and World Bank; to the grass-roots 
movements in Latin America that occupied factories in Argentina, rendered Chiapas 
Image © Lisa Temple-Cox 
© 2009 ephemera 9(3): 195-200 Throwing shoes… 
editorial Nick Butler, Chris Land and Martyna !liwa 
197 
ungovernable, and brought Chavez and Morales to power on the back of popular revolt. 
In each case, it is the grounded uprising from below – from the feet and from the grass – 
that produces change and movement, even in the elevated spheres of ideology and 
theory. Without these material practices, without these movements of bodies, both 
individual/human and collective/social, Post-Marxist theory would not, could not, be 
what it is today. In a sense, then, Harvie is alerting us to the real base upon which 
shifting intellectual histories are grounded and need to be articulated. 
These themes of insubordination and rage are most clearly presented in Memos’ article 
‘Dignified rage, insubordination and militant optimism’. Here, Memos recounts the 
Greek uprising of December 2008 in terms that recall Camus’ observation that revolt 
precedes revolution, and therefore any ‘serious’ political change; that it issues from the 
feet and the legs; that revolt rises from a position of genuflection to take a stand, 
literally, against power. It is only subsequently that this refusal migrates up the body, to 
the mind, where it takes the form of political strategy and theory, and can truly become 
revolution. In Memos’ analysis, the Greek uprising was properly a revolt, an 
insurrection that refused both strategic thought and faciality. In its condemnation of the 
riots, Memos tells us, the Greek Communist party counter-posed the rage and 
indignation of those who rose up, to the ‘mature’, ‘calm’ thought of a ‘real’ uprising, 
with its ‘demands and goals [and] political purpose.’ Within the grid of intelligibility 
shared by both the right-wing government and the Communist Party in Greece, the 
revolt of masked youths, immigrants, workers and ‘ordinary people’ was 
incomprehensible. Those involved in the riots had no place in the conception of politics 
held by those in either the ruling parties or the opposition parties. Their organizational 
logic came from outside the orthodox political rationality, and their voice – a cry of rage 
– was heard as an incoherent cacophony rather than as a valid form of ‘political’ 
expression. Not only could the rioters not be heard, they could not even be seen. Their 
actions were characterised as the ‘blind violence of the hooded people’: those who 
reject faciality and thus cannot be recognised. And yet, as Memos reminds us, it is 
precisely because of this invisibility in the face of power, which sees nothing but a 
faceless mass, that so many involved in uprisings cover their face so that they can be 
seen, or at least can no longer be ignored. 
As Jacques Rancière suggests, it is this demand for participation from outside the 
dominant grids of perception and intelligibility, from outside the normal roles and parts 
allocated by established political process, that characterises the political moment and 
significance of democracy: 
As we know, democracy is a term invented by its opponents, by all those who were ‘qualified’ to 
govern because of seniority, birth, wealth, virtue and knowledge. Using it as a term of derision, 
they articulated an unprecedented reversal of the order of things: the ‘power of the demos’ means 
that those who rule are those who have no specificity in common, apart from their having no 
qualification for governing. Before being the name of a community, demos is the name of a part of 
the community: namely, the poor. The ‘poor,’ however, does not designate an economically 
disadvantaged part of the population; it simply designates the category of people who do not 
count, those who have no qualifications to part-take in arche [rule], no qualification for being 
taken into account. (Rancière, 2001: 6, italics added) 
With the example of the Greek uprising, then, we see the demands of a poor who are 
not, or not only, poor in terms that can be remedied by distributive justice, but who are 
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poor in terms of participative justice. Their struggle is thus more than a struggle against 
power, against capital and the state, but also a struggle for democracy and dignity. 
These lines of political struggle, violent revolt, and ideology again intersect in Uli 
Edel’s film The Baader-Meinhof Complex, reviewed here by Raphael Schlembach. In 
his review, Schlembach highlights the ways in which Edel’s film downplays the 
political nature of the Red Army Factions’ (RAF) armed insurrection. Instead, the film 
focuses on the psychological maladaption of its members, who are said to have had 
personal rather than political reasons for their revolt (in much the same way as the 
Communist Party explained the Greek riots in terms of the immaturity of its young 
participants rather than as a politically meaningful expression of their rage). 
Schlembach is careful, however, not simply to revel in an uncritical celebration of 
violence and armed insurrection. In the second part of his review, he describes how the 
RAF’s unreflexive anti-imperialist stance, and their celebration of action over critique, 
gradually drew the group into nationalism and anti-Semitism. Whilst Edel’s film 
reinscribes ‘politics’ within a well established grid of familial relations and personal 
psychology, the reality of armed insurrection brings out the fascism of the face. The 
effect of the RAF’s decent into anti-semitism, reproducing imperialist and fascistic 
political formulations, suggests something of the difficulties encountered when 
challenging State power on its home terrain of violence and militarization. This form of 
opposition, it would appear, does nothing to unsettle an underlying grid of intelligibility 
and create spaces for new political subjectivities to experiment and become. Instead it 
reinforces old antagonisms and subject positions, struggling over who will dominate, 
rather than articulating a genuinely radical demand for participation. For Rancière 
(2004) this is true politics, the articulation of a demand that recomposes the plane of the 
political, effecting ‘a redistribution of the sensible’ that changes whose voices can be 
heard and what can be seen. 
In her review of Boucher’s The Charmed Circle of Ideology, Anna Wo!niak addresses 
Boucher’s claim that postmarxism, particularly Žižek’s version, reduces ‘politics and 
economics to ideological struggle’. For Wozniak, and for Boucher, what is at stake here 
is a concept of the ‘real’ – the base, ground, or feet – upon which solid political and 
economic analysis and action can stand firm and secure. Boucher’s challenge to 
postmarxism is that its emphasis on ideology leads us inexorably towards a position of 
‘irrationality and relativism’ that precludes any serious political engagement. With 
Wo!niak, and perhaps also Memos and Schlembach, we should pause with caution at 
this attribution of irrationality, since this is itself an ideological product: the result of a 
specific logic of ideas that serves to demarcate ‘rational political discourse’ from the 
seemingly incoherent babble of the demos." Žižek’s concern with ‘how we are to 
reinvent the political space in today’s conditions of globalization’ thus reflects 
Rancière’s conception of democratic politics as a demand for a place, for participation 
in a political space that would necessarily be reconfigured by this admission.  
The tension between Boucher and Žižek" is one of realism versus relativism, a debate 
that Garance Maréchal, in her article ‘Flat-pack philosophy’ turns to in the more 
narrowly circumscribed field of ‘organization studies’.  Although she questions the lines 
along which the debate between realism and relativism have been drawn, and prefers 
the concept of ‘dialogue’ to the more aggressive ‘debate’, Maréchal is particularly 
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concerned with the ways in which theorists have sought to defend ‘realism’ through a 
‘death and furniture’ style of argumentation. Here we are thrown back upon shoes and 
the ground they conventionally tread. When Boswell famously asked Samuel Johnson 
his opinion of Bishop Berkeley’s idealism, the man of letters reputedly kicked a stone, 
proclaiming ‘I refute him thus’. It is a defence that Maréchal refers to as the furniture 
argument, as when philosophers bang on tables (as if by so doing they could leave the 
sphere of discourse and bring bodies in contact with a brute, dumb and undeniable 
reality). Maréchal points to the paradox that such encounters with reality are themselves 
rhetorical devices, as the persistence of the story of Johnson’s foot-stone encounter 
bears witness. 
But what seems to be most pressingly at stake in Maréchal’s discussion is the death 
argument and the suggestion that the denial of a basic reality leaves little purchase upon 
it for politics and for ethics.  According to Maréchal, the realists claim that a refusal to 
separate epistemology and ontology, and to give some ground for the ‘reality’ of the 
latter, leaves no space on which to understand the limits and extent of human agency. It 
ushers in a kind of ethical relativism on the basis of which political and moral action is 
impossible. And yet, if we return to the idea of the foot and the stone, we find again and 
again the shoe at the heart of political action. In the eco-activist classic The Monkey 
Wrench Gang, Edward Abby has the most educated of his protagonists repeatedly 
deploy the refrain of ‘I refute it thus’ when engaged in activities from kicking over ant-
hills to sabotaging bulldozers and blowing up dams (Abbey, 1985; Jones, 2006). And, 
lest we forget, the very term sabotage derives from the sabot – the clog – that was 
supposedly used to smash early industrial machinery. The irrefutable refutation of the 
kick and the clog – the throwing of a shoe – is already politically, ethically, 
organizationally and technologically situated. Far from the basic ground of a universal, 
common-sense reality that cannot be denied, the shoe/stone is a political and discursive 
weapon precisely because it can resist the common-sense, ideological systems of the 
face and demand the impossible. 
As the slogans on the streets of Paris in May 1968 had it, ‘sous la pave, la plage’ – 
beneath the cobble-stones, the beach – an invitation on the one hand to dig up the 
cobbles and throw them at the police, and on the other to use them to build the 
Hacienda, a utopian counter-reality or collective fantasy that would enable serious 
political and moral action by imagining a world that is radically different. The throwing 
of a shoe or stone thus has a double function. It refuses and resists, demanding a halt to 
technological ‘progress’ or an end to occupation. But it also has a positive moment in 
which it signifies a reassertion of the thrower’s humanity and demands, or simply takes, 
a part in democratic determination. In this sense, the throwing of a shoe is a demand for 
participative justice. It is both a refusal to stand quietly in line and to take one’s allotted 
place in the social division of labour, and an assertion of the right to be counted 
amongst the demos, the people, and to have a voice – to part-take – in the political 
process. 
In another contribution to this issue, Peter Sloterdijk picks up this issue of building and 
architecture to ask about the desires that inspire the building of monuments and 
dwellings. In one sense, his concern is with the desire to erect structures that shape and 
constrain, but also enable and facilitate, forms of organization and behaviour. In another 
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sense, perhaps, he is responding to the building project of reconstruction that is the 
other side of the destruction and demolition that results from the thrown clog, shoe or 
stone – the time of counter-reality or fantasy when stones are no longer kicked or 
thrown but picked up and reorganized to create something new. 
For Sloterdijk, however, the ground upon which building takes place is essential: It is 
the savannah. In the forests, living as tree-apes, proto-humans did not need shoes or 
stone houses. It is only once the ape drifts out onto the open plains of the savannah, and 
starts walking upright, that the foot is flattened and deterritorialised from its early 
climbing function to be reterritorialised as a distinctive ‘foot’. Likewise, the hands are 
deterritorialised from their locomotive function and freed up to enter into new 
assemblages with, eventually, shoe-making instruments, but first with stones and flint 
tools. Upright on the savannah, it is not only the hands and feet that are de- and 
reterritorialised in this way; the entire perceptual apparatus is transformed as it adapts to 
new vistas and distances. As Sloterdijk puts it, once it becomes able to see the approach 
of a predator or other dangers from far away, the savannah-ape is introduced 
simultaneously to boredom. Removed from the constant vigilance of the jungle, and 
overwhelmed by boredom and joblessness, the savannah-ape sets its hands and tools to 
work and builds. 
What is built out there on the savannah? In short, ‘boredom containers’. The primary 
function of architecture, Sloterdijk tells us, is to contain boredom. So the savannah-ape 
builds in order to fend off boredom and joblessness, and slowly but surely the open 
savannah is reduced to a closed monastic cell. Isolated within four walls, and trapped 
within the strict hierarchy of the Church, the process of destruction and new building 
must start again. Since, as Pascal has it, ‘no-one is able to stay quietly in his own room’, 
their inhabitants will inevitably begin to dismantle the monastic cells as they reach out 
for a democratic form of participation that is not premised upon a preordained 
compartmentalization and social isolation. Cut off from each other, and condemned to 
stare only at the imponderable face of God, the Brothers slowly remove their clogs… 
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